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I. Introduction 
 
This paper discusses the topic of ‘Comparing Laws’ in the specific context of the 
decentralised enforcement of EU competition law and the parallel application of national 
competition laws. More specifically, it deals with the harmonisation process between the 
Member States’ and the EU competition laws. This is a unique process as at first sight it 
accommodates regulatory competition between the Member States and the Commission, 
resulting in the emergence of voluntary harmonisation. However, in fact the decentralised 
enforcement regime has preserved the Commission’s dominance and Europeanised national 
competition laws to the model of EU law. Still, this process involves active comparative 
exercises by both the European Commission and the 27 Member States. The paper addresses 
the question why and how the Commission and the Member States compare competition 
rules. What makes these comparative exercises worth analysing is, on the one hand, that they 
are of recent origin and take place against a new decentralised enforcement system which has 
recently been transformed from a supranational EU policy into one which is subject to similar 
problems of multi-level governance as other substantive parts of EU law; on the other hand, 
that the creation of the European Competition Network (ECN) opened the way for 
spontaneous harmonisation between national and EU competition laws, but at the same time 
its hierarchical structure preserved certain constraints that limit its functioning as a platform of 
true regulatory competition. 
The public enforcement of EU competition law takes place in a multiple layered 
setting composed of EU and national rules and supervised by the Commission and 27 national 
competition authorities (hereinafter NCAs). While the substantive EU rules that are to be 
enforced are the same and there is also a high convergence between substantive competition 
rules in national legislations, the procedural rules and the institutional settings that together 
form the framework of enforcement have been much less harmonised and reveal a challenging 
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landscape for comparative analysis. The role of the Commission in conducting such 
comparisons among the various enforcement methods and institutional settings of the Member 
States will be examined in the Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 and the 
Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report on the functioning of Regulation 
1/20031, as well as through the work of the ECN. The role of the NCAs in comparing the 
various enforcement rules and agency models can be analysed through their work in the ECN.  
In analysing these comparative exercises, the paper will look into the question of what 
the purpose of these comparative efforts is and which methods of comparison are being used. 
Furthermore, the paper will also critically analyse the methods of voluntary convergence that 
are being applied in the Member States and the possibility of further extended harmonisation 
of the administrative procedural rules, as well as certain substantive rules, in the Member 
States. 
Accordingly, the next section sets out the background of the comparative analysis and 
explains the legal changes that opened the comparative discourse on competition laws in 
Europe. Section III describes the impact of Regulation 1/2003 on the Member States’ 
substantive rules, procedural rules and their NCAs’ institutional designs. Section IV discusses 
the methods and the underlying reasons behind the Commission’s comparative studies and the 
work within the ECN. Finally, section V takes a critical look at the Commission’s proposal to 
further harmonise substantive and procedural rules as well as at the present voluntary 
harmonisation between the EU and national rules. The paper closes with conclusions. 
 
II. The challenging landscape of EU competition law enforcement for 
comparative study 
 
Competition law has for long offered little challenge for comparative research. This 
was due to a number of facts. First, many Member States lacked a proper competition law and 
enforcement regime until the 1980s or even late 1990s. Second, competition law in many 
Member States has not been regarded as an economic policy tool of primary importance.2 
Third, the question of convergence and divergence between the different national regimes 
remained largely unaddressed and without significant legal or economic consequences. This, 
                                                 
1
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report on the 
Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, SEC/2009/574 final, 29 April 2009, paras. 160-169, 180-181. 
2
 F. CENGIZ, Regulation 1/2003 Revisited, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2009-042, 24 November 
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however, all changed with the process of enlargement and the modernisation of EU 
competition law in 2004. 
Before modernisation in 2004 the enforcement of European competition law was 
concentrated in the hands of the Commission and was an important exception to the general 
enforcement method of Community laws by Member States’ authorities. This meant, on the 
one hand, that the relations between Community and national competition laws remained 
mostly unaddressed, in contrast to the judicial supremacy doctrine in other substantive areas 
of EU law, and, on the other hand, that competition policy was immune from general 
problems of multi-level governance.3 Modernisation and more specifically Article 3(1) of 
Regulation 1/2003 have imposed not only a possibility but also an obligation on the Member 
States’ NCAs to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU parallel to their national competition rules 
when the effect on trade criterion is fulfilled, and introduced a strict supremacy standard. In 
fact, this meant that national provisions have to comply with the EU interpretations of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU when they are applied parallel to their national rules. In accordance with 
Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation 1/2003 the convergence rule does not apply to unilateral 
conduct, national merger laws and laws pursuing a predominantly different objective such as 
unfair trade practices.  
While the convergence rule acts as a radical intervention in the domestic legal systems 
of the Member States, it should be remembered that this convergence had taken place or had 
been ongoing before Regulation 1/2003 came into force.4 Many EU Member States had 
abandoned their ineffective competition regulation based on the so-called administrative 
control model during the 1980s and 1990s and had adopted a competition law system similar 
to the rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the EC Merger Regulation.5 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., pp. 26, 30. 
4
 R.J. VAN DEN BERGH and P.D. CAMESASCA, European Competition Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Perspective. Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2001, pp. 125-126. 
5
 This is equally true for the new Member States, where competition was actually non-existent in the 
socialist area and where competition was of great importance in creating a functioning market economy. The 
basic conditions for free competition were introduced by the legal reforms between 1989 and 1991. From 1990 
onwards new national competition laws were enacted and thus the enforcement of competition law could begin. 
After 1990 accession to the European Union became the most relevant external pressure to influence competition 
policies in Eastern Europe. See, for more details: K.J. CSERES, “Multijurisdictional Competition Law 
Enforcement: the Interface Between European Competition Law and the Competition Laws of the New Member 
States”, European Competition Journal, 2007, Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp.465-502; K.J. CSERES, “The Impact of 
Regulation 1/2003 in the New Member States”, Competition Law Review, 2010, Vol. 6, Issue 2, forthcoming. 
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Competition law and policy had gained importance and the ineffective abuse systems, which 
in certain jurisdictions included criminal law enforcement, had been abandoned.6 
However, Regulation 1/2003 did accelerate the process of convergence and 
Europeanisation in the field of substantive competition rules. This convergence was most 
prominent with regard to Article 101-like cartel prohibitions but not with regard to unilateral 
conduct and procedural rules. Legal diversity of national procedures and institutional designs 
remains a challenge to the envisaged goal of uniform and consistent application of EU 
competition law by all 28 enforcers, the Commission and the 27 NCAs. 
This challenge began to take shape when the enlargement of 2004 made the relevance 
of enforcement for the effective working of EU rules manifest. Procedural diversity among 
Member States became visible not only in competition law but also in other substantive fields 
such as consumer law. While previously issues of enforcement and institutional structures 
were regarded to remain in the exclusive competence of the Member States, in accordance 
with the Community principles of procedural autonomy and institutional neutrality, 
enlargement has pushed crucial questions of enforcement and institutional choice to the 
forefront of the EU agenda.7 In the absence of a clear Union blueprint for effective 
enforcement methods and optimal institutional design, the old and new Member States were 
given considerable leeway in adapting the acquis to their own institutional preferences and 
legal systems.  
EU competition law now offers a unique platform for comparative analysis for four 
reasons. First, European competition law is legislated through directly applicable Treaty 
provisions and regulations and thus European competition rules directly enter national legal 
systems and represent a higher pressure and form an important incentive to align national 
competition rules to the EU rules. This incentive has been even more pressing in the new 
                                                 
6
 D.J. GERBER, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1998, pp. 402-403. The new competition laws followed a prohibition system and enforcement 
was entrusted to an administrative body with judicial-like decision-making. Enforcement became primarily 
administrative law-based, with administrative law sanctions. These new competition regimes worked more 
effectively than their predecessors and indeed their main achievement was to gain social and political support for 
the enforcement of competition law. 
7
 This trend can be seen in many other policy areas. In consumer protection, for example, very similar 
developments take place today. See K.J. CSERES, “Collective Consumer Actions: A Competition Law 
Perspective”, in W. H. VAN BOOM and M. LOOS eds., Collective Consumer Interests and How They Are 
Served Best in Europe: Legal Aspects and Policy Issues on the Border Between Private Law and Public Policy, 
Europa Law Publishing, 2007; K.J. CSERES, “Consumer Protection in Eastern-European Member States”, in 
Vergelijkend Wijs, Kluwer, 2007, forthcoming. 
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Member States, where the whole arsenal of competition law had to be created within a short 
period of time.8  
Second, Regulation 1/20039 and the so-called modernisation package devolved 
enforcement powers to the national competition authorities and the national courts10 and have 
created a system of parallel competences and simultaneous application of EU and national 
competition law. The new enforcement system not only delegated enforcement powers to 
national actors but also increased the Europeanisation of competition laws through 
cooperation between the European Commission and the NCAs. In the new framework, 
national competition legislations operate in parallel with EU competition law and the national 
competition authorities and/or courts apply both national and European competition rules. In 
enforcing the EU competition rules, full cooperation between the Commission and the 
national authorities of the Member States is necessitated by the fact that the European 
competition rules became directly applicable in the whole Union. The interaction between the 
European Commission and the national competition authorities is required by Article 11 of 
Regulation 1/2003. The NCAs and the Commission form a network of public authorities co-
operating closely together. This so-called European Competition Network provides a focus for 
regular contact and consultation on enforcement policy and the Commission has a central role 
in the network in order to ensure consistent application of the rules. 
Third, the new decentralised enforcement system preserved one of the most 
controversial elements of the previous centralised system, namely the Commission’s central 
role in the enforcement framework. Before the 2004 modernisation of EU competition law, 
the Commission had a central monopoly-like role in the enforcement of EU competition law. 
In fact, competition law and policy acted as the “first supranational policy in the European 
Union”.11 Under the enforcement framework of Regulation 17/6212, the Commission enjoyed 
a broad margin of discretion in applying the conditions under Article 101(3). On several 
occasions, the European Courts have acknowledged the Commission’s discretionary powers 
                                                 
8
 Accession to the EU acted as considerable political and economic pressure and provided the most 
significant influence on the way competition laws have been shaped in the CEECs.  
9
 EC Council, Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, No 1/2003/EC, 16 Dec. 2002, Official Journal, 2003, L 1. 
10
 Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 1/2003. 
11
 L. McGOWAN and S. WILKS, “The First Supranational Policy in the European Union: 
Competition Policy”, European Journal of Political Research, 1995, Vol 28, p. 141, at p. 149. 
12
 EEC Council, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, No 17/62 (EEC), 
Official Journal, 2003, L 1. 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES – VOL 3 ISSUE 1 (2010) 
 12 
under Article 101(3)13 and have neither dealt with the Commission’s substantive application 
of the criteria under Article 101(3), nor intervened in Commission decisions.14 The fact that 
the Commission no longer has a monopoly on the application of Article 101(3) and this 
provision can be applied by the NCAs and the national courts of the Member States has 
relevant implications for uniform law enforcement. As the Commission no longer has such 
considerable leeway under Article 101(3), it tried to narrow down the application of this 
provision to accommodate only pro-competitive effects as potential justification for anti-
competitive restraints.15   
Regulation 1/2003 granted the Commission new enforcement powers and extended 
some existing ones,16 and has given it the prerogative to end investigations under Article 101 
and 102 by NCAs by opening its own proceedings against the same violation.17 In the 
hierarchical structure of the ECN, the Commission acts as primus inter pares and as manager 
of the system that needs to guard uniform application of EU rules. However, the Commission 
escapes accountability and control mechanisms through the informal character of the ECN. 
Fourth, while Member States significantly harmonised substantive competition rules, a 
similar convergence of procedural rules or institutional designs has not taken place. The exact 
puzzles of converging and diverging rules across the Member States and EU law are subject to 
comparisons by both the Commission and the Member States. 
                                                 
13
 E.C.J., Case C-26/76, Metro I v. Commission, para. 45; E.C.J., Case C-71/74, Frubo v. Commission,  
para. 43. The Courts have held that the judicial review of the Commission’s decisions under Article 81(3) is 
limited to establishing whether the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment, whether procedural 
rules had been complied with, or whether proper reasons had been provided. E.C.J., Case C-42/84, Remia BV 
and Others v. Commission, para. 38; E.C.J., Case C-45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer e.V. v. Commission, 
para. 15; more explicitly, the CFI even noted that “the Commission is entitled to base itself on considerations 
connected with the pursuit of the public interest in order to grant exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty.” 
However, in this case it did not show that such considerations required exclusivity of rights to transmit sports 
events and that exclusivity was indispensable in order to allow a fair return on investments. C.F.I., Cases T-
528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and T-546/93, Métropole Télévision and Others v. Commission, para. 118. 
14
 This, however, did not mean that the logic and rationality of Commission decisions under Article 81 
(3) have not been scrutinised and criticised. The CFI has on several occasions criticised the lack of a proper 
economic analysis in the Commission’s decisions. See, for example, C.F.I., Case T-374/94, European Night 
Services and Others v. Commission, paras. 103-115, 140, 159; C.F.I., Cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93 and 
T-546/93, Métropole Télévision and Others v. Commission, para. 120. 
15
 The Commission can set out the lines of European competition policy but cannot alter the legal 
framework, namely the open and broad norm of Article 101(3) that allows national authorities to balance public 
policy goals with competition principles. Even though the new approach is laid down in the Guidelines on the 
application of Article 101(3), the question whether and to what extent non-competition policy objectives can be 
taken into account under Article 101(3) remains unclear. H. SCHWEITZER, Competition Law and Public 
Policy: Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship. The Example of Art. 81, EUI Working Paper, LAW 2007/30, 
Florence, European University Institute, 2007, pp. 8-9. 
16
 Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 grants the Commission the power of accepting commitments from the 
parties under investigation in Articles 101 and 102 procedures and making these commitments binding. 
Regulation 1/2003 also extended its search powers during sector inquiries. 
17
 Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003. 
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In sum, despite the obligatory and voluntary convergence of substantive and certain 
procedural rules in national competition laws, the change was radical, with relevant policy 
implications for the Commission. On the one hand, the relevance of national competition laws 
and especially procedural rules has increased and has been pushed to the center of the 
Commission’s attention. When NCAs apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, they make use of 
their national procedural rules and impose remedies and sanctions that are available in their 
respective legal system. On the other hand, the issue was raised whether consistent policy 
enforcement and the effective functioning of a network requires a certain degree of 
harmonisation of procedures, resources, experiences and independence of the NCAs.18  
The Commission started relying on the effective administrative enforcement of EU 
rules through national administrative procedures and institutions. Immune from EU law 
regulation until 2004, now the national procedural rules and institutional settings became 
crucial for the uniform and consistent application of EU competition law, and, as a result, 
were subjected to the Commission’s comparative analysis. 
In the following, first, the present enforcement system will be described briefly by 
focusing on the impact of Regulation 1/2003 on the substantive, procedural rules and the 
institutional designs of the Member States. This section describes the scene where the new 
challenges of convergence and divergence between national laws took shape and which forms 
the subject of the comparative analysis in EU competition law. Then the Commission’s and 
the ECN’s comparative analysis will be further reviewed by revealing the ratio as well as the 
method of their comparative exercises. Finally, the harmonisation proposals will be evaluated. 
 
III. Regulation 1/2003: the framework of comparison  
 
A. The impact of Regulation 1/2003 
 
The impact of Regulation 1/2003 on national legal systems can be seen clearly in the 
substantive competition rules. EU leverage has been most noticeable and direct on the 
statutory enactments of substantive competition law. However, the Regulation and the 
                                                 
18
 F. CENGIZ, Regulation 1/2003 Revisited, o.c., p. 17; C. GAUER, “Does the Effectiveness of the 
EU Network of Competition Authorities Require a Certain Degree of Harmonisation of National Procedures and 
Sanctions?”, in C.D. EHLEMANN and I. ATANASIU eds., European Competition Law Annual 2000: The 
Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001, pp. 187-201; F. JENNY, “Does the 
Effectiveness of the EU Network of Competition Authorities Depend on a Certain Degree of Homogeneity 
within its Membership?”, in C.D. EHLEMANN and I. ATANASIU eds., European Competition Law Annual 
2000, o.c., pp. 208-210. 
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Commission’s policy were less pronounced with regard to the development of procedural 
rules and the institutional framework to be chosen by the Member States.  
The new procedural framework abolished the notification system and Article 101 
became directly applicable in its entirety, thus including Article 101(3). This required the 
Member States to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, without the need for notification and a 
prior administrative decision on Article 101(3). The most important legal obligations that 
stemmed from Regulation 1/2003 for all the Member States were laid down in Article 3, 
namely the obligation for national competition authorities and national courts to apply 
Articles 101 and 102, as well as the convergence rule for Article 101, and in Article 35 in 
conjunction with Article 5, the obligation to empower national competition authorities. 
Beyond these specific obligations laid down in Regulation 1/2003, it has not been 
made clear what institutional and substantive solutions the Member States had to implement 
in their respective legal system beyond the obligation to bring their competition rules in 
conformity with EU law. For example, the candidate countries were never presented the exact 
parameters of their obligation to harmonise their competition laws. Therefore, it can be argued 
that harmonisation in their respective legislative systems was required as far as it was 
indispensable. This is also in line with the general principle of subsidiarity as enshrined in 
Article 5 TEU. In other words, the new Member States, just like the old Member States, had 
considerable latitude in deciding what kind of substantive and institutional regime they would 
adopt. 
This freedom is, however, not unlimited. Article 4(3) TEU requires the Member States 
to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the EU 
Treaty and facilitate achievement of the Community’s tasks. Moreover, they should “abstain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty”. On 
the basis of this loyalty principle, the European Court of Justice has also developed the so-
called useful effect doctrine within the realm of competition law. According to this doctrine, 
the Member States may not introduce legislation or take decisions which would deprive the 
competition rules of their useful effect.19 
 
 
                                                 
19
 This doctrine has no explicit legal basis in the EC Treaty. It was founded on Article 3(1) (g)(now 
implemented in Protocol No. 27 on the internal market and competition), read in conjunction with Article 10 
(now Article 4(3) TEU) and Articles 81 and 82 EC (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). E.C.J., Case 267/86, Van 
Eycke v. ASPA, 1988 ECR 4769, para. 16. 
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B. The impact of Regulation 1/2003 on substantive rules  
 
Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 has directly influenced the substance of national 
competition rules. Article 3(1) defines the principle of simultaneous application of national 
law and competition law with the limitation posed in Article 3(2): Member States may not 
adopt and apply on their territory stricter national competition laws which prohibit 
agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States but which do not restrict competition within the meaning of 
Article 101(1), or which fulfill the conditions of Article 101(3) or which are covered by a 
Regulation for the application of Article 101(3). In other words, stricter national competition 
laws are not as such objectionable, as long as they are not applied, in breach of Article 3(2), to 
agreements, concerted practices and decisions of associations of undertakings that fall within 
the jurisdictional scope of the EU competition rules. The convergence rule contained in 
paragraph 2, seeks to create a level playing field by providing for a single standard of 
assessment which allows undertakings to design EU-wide business strategies without having 
to check them against all the relevant national sets of competition rules. While leeways for 
national law still exist under Article 3(2), such as inherent restrictions, national group 
exemptions and national statutory de minimis rules, most of the Member States have enacted 
similar provisions to Article 101 and certain countries such as Italy and Luxembourg even 
opted for the exclusive application of EU competition law.20 Stakeholders from the legal and 
business communities have largely confirmed that Regulation 1/2003 has positively 
contributed to the creation of a level playing field, along with the substantive convergence of 
national laws with EC competition rules.21 
Nevertheless, this principle of convergence does not apply with regard to prohibiting 
and imposing sanctions on unilateral conduct.22 Article 3(3) further excludes from the 
principle of convergence national merger laws and laws having a different objective than the 
protection of competition.23  
The application of stricter national rules for unilateral conduct is worth further 
remarks. Recital 8 of Regulation 1/2003 explicitly mentions provisions regulating cases of 
                                                 
20
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report on the 
Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, o.c., paras .141, 152. 
21
 Ibid., par a. 142. 
22
 Recital 8 of Regulation 1/2003.  
23
 Recital 9 of Regulation 1/2003. 
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abuse of superior bargaining power or economic dependence. The assessment of unequal 
bargaining power is currently the subject of vigorous discussion in competition law and one of 
the questions being discussed is whether competition law or private law or other specific 
legislation should regulate this issue and when regulation exists, whether competition 
authorities or civil courts should enforce it. Both the EU Commission Staff Working Paper 
Accompanying the Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/200324 and a recent survey of the 
International Competition Network25 discussed the controversial topic of abuse of superior 
bargaining power (ASBP).26 
Some jurisdictions, for example Germany, employ specific provisions in their 
competition law prohibiting abuse of superior buying power, others employ them in other 
specific contexts such as tort liability under the commercial code like France. Again in other 
jurisdictions, a private civil remedy (Italy) or separate administrative regulation of retail 
chains exist. A separate administrative act is often the legislative model opted for by the 
CEECs, like in Hungary,27 Slovakia,28 and a draft law in the Czech Republic.29 However, in 
Latvia the provision is part of the competition law.30 The diversity of regulatory standards on 
                                                 
24
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report on the 
Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, o.c., paras. 160-169, 180-181. 
25
 International Competition Network, Report on Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position, 2008, 
http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc386.pdf; see also F. JENNY, The “Coming Out” 
of Abuse of Superior Bargaining Power in the Antitrust World, UNCTAD, 2008, 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/ditc_ccpb/docs/ditc_ccpb0008_en.pdf. 
26
 Abuse of superior bargaining power typically includes, but is not limited to, a situation in which a 
party makes use of its superior bargaining position relative to another party with whom it maintains a continuous 
business relationship to take any act such as to unjustly, in light of normal business practices, cause the other 
party to provide money, service or other economic benefits. A party in the superior bargaining position does not 
necessarily have to be a dominant firm or firm with significant market power. International Competition 
Network, Report on Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position, o.c., p..3. 
27
 Act on Trade of 2005 lists abuses of “significant market power”, created basically for supermarket 
practices against retailers. It introduced specific rules on undertakings of significant market power and 
empowered the GVH (NCA) to apply the procedural rules on abuse of dominance in cases of infringements of 
the prohibitions enumerated by the Act on Trade. 
28
 Act on Unfair Conditions in Business Relationships (AUC) of 11 April 2008. 
29
 There have been several attempts to introduce the prohibition of the abuse of economic dependency 
into national law. A proposal currently being discussed in parliament suggests that such a position on the 
relevant market, which enables an undertaking to establish substantially more favourable business conditions 
with an economically dependent undertaking than it could without such a position, shall be considered an abuse 
of economic dependency and shall be prohibited. It seems that at least concerning food, the described regulations 
will be introduced. D. BICKOVÁ and A. BRAUN, Section 4: Country Chapters, Czech Republic, in The 
European Antitrust Review 2010; International Competition Network, Report on Abuse of Superior 
Bargaining Position, o.c., p. 6; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the 
Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, o.c., paras. 160-169. 
30
 Section 13(2) of the Competition Law provides that a dominant position in the retail sector is held by 
such market participant or several market participants, which, taking into consideration its purchasing power for 
a sufficient length of time and dependency of suppliers in the relevant market, has the capacity to directly or 
indirectly apply or impose unfair and unjustified conditions, provisions and payments on the suppliers and has 
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unilateral conduct in the Member States has been critically assessed by stakeholders in the 
consultation process on Regulation 1/2003 and the Commission has devoted substantial 
analysis to the various legislations in the Staff Working Paper.31 Moreover, the Commission 
has proposed to examine further the matter both with regard to the problems such as the 
causes of diversity as well as the need for some kind of harmonisation action.32 This issue will 
be further discussed below in section IV. 
 
C. The impact of Regulation 1/2003 on procedural rules 
 
Regulation 1/2003 also contains certain procedural rules with regard to the powers of 
the national competition authorities. Article 5 lists the powers of the NCAs when they apply 
Articles 101 and 102 such as finding an infringement, ordering interim measures, accepting 
commitments and imposing fines. The Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the 
Report on Regulation 1/2003 admits that Article 5 is a very basic provision and does not 
formally regulate or harmonise the procedural rules followed by the NCAs or the ECN 
beyond Article 5.33 This means that the NCAs apply the same substantive rules but in 
divergent procedural frameworks and they may impose different sanctions as well. These 
procedural differences were to some extent addressed in Articles 11 and 12 of Regulation 
1/2003 with regard to the cooperation within the ECN. Despite this fact, the Member States 
have voluntarily converged their procedural rules to the EU procedural provisions applicable 
to the Commission. Table I. below shows this voluntary convergence. 
                                                                                                                                                         
the capacity to significantly hinder, restrict or distort competition in any relevant market in the territory of 
Latvia. Any market participant that holds the dominant position in the retail sector is prohibited from abusing 
such dominant position in the territory of Latvia. The relevant section then provides an exhaustive list of abuses 
of a dominant position in the retail sector. 
31
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report on the 
Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, o.c., paras. 160-176. 
32
 Ibid., para. 179. 
33
 Ibid., para. 200. 
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TABLE I - Powers of NCAs: legislative implementation after Regulation 1/2003 
Convergence of 
national competition 
laws with Regulation 
1/2003 
 
YES 
  
NO 
 
Partial implementation 
 
 
Power to impose 
structural remedies 
 
Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Austria, 
Belgium, Spain, Greece, 
Ireland, Malta, 
Netherlands, UK, 
Germany 
 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Denmark, 
Finland, Portugal, 
Luxembourg 
Bulgaria, Romania, 
Sweden, France 
 
 
Power to order interim  
measures 
Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Romania, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Austria, 
Belgium, Spain, Greece, 
Ireland, Malta, 
Netherlands, UK, 
Germany, Finland, 
France, Sweden, 
Portugal, Italy 
Estonia, Denmark Bulgaria, Luxembourg, 
Cyprus 
 
 
Power to adopt 
commitments 
 
Bulgaria, Romania, 
Lithuania, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Slovakia,Czech 
Republic, Poland, 
Austria, Belgium, Spain, 
Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands, UK, 
Germany, Finland, 
France, Sweden, Italy, 
Luxembourg 
Estonia, Malta 
 
Latvia, Portugal, Cyprus 
 
Power to seal business 
premises, books 
 
Lithuania, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, Poland, 
Belgium, Spain, Greece, 
Netherlands, UK, 
Germany, Finland, 
France, Sweden, 
Denmark 
Slovenia, Austria, 
Ireland, Luxembourg 
 
Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Romania, Italy, Cyprus,  
 
 
Power to inspect 
private premises 
 
Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Romania, Austria, 
Belgium, Spain, Finald, 
France, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Sweden, 
UK 
Bulgaria, Italy, Portugal, 
Denmark 
Lithuania, Cyprus, 
Germany 
 
 
Calculation of fine 
Max. 10% of 
undertaking’s turnover 
Czech Republic, 
Slovenia,  Slovakia, 
Latvia, Romania, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland 
Estonia (fixed) 
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Fines on association of 
undertakings 
Hungary, Latvia 
Lithuania, Belgium, 
Spain, Finland, 
Netherlands 
Estonia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Poland, 
Romania 
Luxembourg 
Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Austria, 
Germany, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Sweden, 
UK 
 
Informal guidance 
 
Latvia, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, Spain, 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, UK 
Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Estonia, 
France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Malta 
 
Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, 
Cyprus 
 
 
Leniency 
Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Spain, 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, UK, France, 
Greece, Luxembourg, 
Finland, Italy, Cyprus 
Malta Slovenia34 
Source: Results of the questionnaire on the reform of Member States' national competition laws after EC 
Regulation No. 1/2003; International Comparative Legal Guide, Enforcement of Competition Law 2009, Global 
Legal Group, Cartels & Leniency 2009, Country Reports, 2009 
 
Yet, the Commission acknowledges that divergences of Member States' enforcement 
systems remain on important aspects such as fines, criminal sanctions, liability in groups of 
undertakings, liability of associations of undertakings, succession of undertakings, 
prescription periods and the standard of proof, the power to impose structural remedies, as 
well as the ability of Member States’ competition authorities to formally set enforcement 
priorities. The Commission Staff Working Paper provides neither data nor an overview of 
these divergences; however, these differences have significant implications for how cases are 
eventually enforced by the NCAs. For example, the Member States’ procedural rules on 
complaints and the rights of complainants during investigation largely differ from one 
another. While some countries provide extensive rights for complainants more or less on 
similar conditions as the European Commission35 in a number of countries the NCAs initiate 
                                                 
34
 A true leniency program does not exist. However, according to Article 76 of the Competition Act the 
fine applicable to an undertaking in a cartel may be waived by the Office if certain conditions are fulfilled. Z. 
ZORIC, N. PIPAN NAHTICAL, “Chapter 37: Slovenia” in Global Legal Group, Cartels & Leniency, 2009, 
p. 219. 
35
 The legal framework for handling of complaints has been laid down by Regulation 1/2003, 
Commission Regulation (EC) 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, No 773/2004/EC, 7 April 2004, Official Journal, 
2004, L 123, and the Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty, Official Journal, 2003, L 1. 
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proceedings exclusively on their own initiative and use complaints merely as a source of 
information. Differences still exist among those countries that grant certain procedural rights 
to complainants. The varying degrees of participation rights in the national procedures can 
jeopardise the uniform application of EU competition law.36  
 
D. The impact of Regulation 1/2003 on institutions  
 
While the transfer of substantive rules could rely on well-defined EU rules, clear 
guidance on how to enforce these rules has not been provided by the EU. Crucial questions of 
institutional choice were left unanswered except for some very general rules in Regulation 
1/2003.  
Under Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003, each Member State had a clear obligation to 
draw up a national competition law and designate a competition authority responsible for the 
application of Articles 101 and 102 before 1 May 2004;37 however, the details were left to the 
Member States themselves. These authorities could be administrative or judicial. The only 
requirement imposed by Article 35, was that the authorities had to be designated in order to 
guarantee that the provisions of Regulation 1/2003 were effectively complied with.38 The 
accession process merely required an adequate administrative capacity through well-
                                                 
36
 Complaints are not only significant sources of market information for NCAs, but complainants’ 
participation in the competition law proceedings constitutes relevant procedural safeguards of good 
administration. On the one hand, while the rights of complainants are not “as far reaching as the right to a fair 
hearing of the companies which are the object of the Commission’s investigation” and their limits “are reached 
where they begin to interfere with those companies’ right to a fair hearing” (E.C.J., Joined Cases 142 and 
156/84, BAT and Reynolds v. Commission, 1987, para. 20), both too broadly and too narrowly defined rights of 
complainants can lead to problems of administrative accountability vis-à-vis the undertakings concerned. On the 
other hand, granting certain procedural rights to those persons and organisations, in particular end-consumers 
whose economic rights have been adversely and directly affected by anti-competitive practices, also serves the 
purpose of sufficiently accounting for the representation of these interests in the procedure of the NCAs. NCAs 
are administrative authorities that must act in the public interest, not a judicial authority the function of which is 
to safeguard individual rights. Moreover, denying participation rights to complainants and structuring the 
procedure exclusively around the rights of the defence of the undertakings targeted is inconsistent with the 
overall aim of the procedure: effective enforcement of competition rules. It is also incongruous with the ultimate 
aim of these rules: ensuring consumer welfare. See also C.F.I., Joined cases T-213/01 and T-214/01, 
Österreichische Postsparkasse v. Commission, para. 112; T-114/92, BEMIM v Commission, 1995, ECR II-147, 
para. 28. 
37
 Article 35(1) of Regulation 1/2003: “The Member States shall designate the competition authority or 
authorities responsible for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in such a way that the provisions of 
this regulation are effectively complied with. The measures necessary to empower those authorities to apply 
those Articles shall be taken before 1 May 2004. The authorities designated may include courts.” 
38
 Point 2 of the Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities provides that 
“[u]nder general principles of Community law, Member States are under an obligation to set up a sanctioning 
system providing for sanctions which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive for infringements of EC law”. 
See also, E.C.J., Case C-176/03, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Union, 
13 September 2005, ECR I-7879, paras. 46-55. 
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functioning competition authorities and thus the new Member States had a great deal of 
freedom in designing the institutional framework of competition law enforcement. Beyond 
Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003, neither further requirements nor formal rules had been 
formulated on the powers and procedures of these competition authorities.39 The competences 
of the national authorities were very roughly set out in Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 1/2003.   
The Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/200340 has acknowledged this 
institutional deficit. In the absence of Community guidance, institutional choices were guided 
by a learning process characterised by improvisation and experimentation. While the 
Community institutions seemed to have pushed towards separate treatment of competition 
law, unfair trade practices and consumer protection, the institutional division of competencies 
at the Community level (DG Competition, DG Sanco, DG Internal Market) has not served as a 
prototype in all Member States. In fact, many Member States have enforcement powers in 
several fields of market regulation and combine several (quasi-)regulatory competences in one 
agency. The diversity of institutional design among competition authorities across the EU is 
based on country-specific institutional traditions and legacies. For example, traditionally the 
new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe entrusted their regulatory agencies with 
broad market regulatory tasks and sometimes with overlapping competences (see Table II).  
Three different models can be distinguished. There are NCAs that have competences 
in other regulatory fields than competition law. For example, the Netherlands Competition 
Authority (NMa) also accommodates the Energy Chamber. Similar institutional change has 
taken place in Estonia and Bulgaria recently. The Estonian NCA (ECA) was transformed into 
an integrated authority by merging with the previously separate communications, energy 
market and railway regulators at the beginning of 2008.41 The Bulgarian NCA took up 
regulatory tasks in the fields of procurement and concession procedures under the Public 
Procurement Act and the Concession Act.42 Monitoring public procurement is a task that can 
                                                 
39
 Although national procedural rules have to provide for admission of the Commission as amicus 
curiae in national procedures, NCAs will have to be empowered to conduct examinations in accordance with 
Regulation 1/2003, and Member States will have to report to the Commission. The Commission retains broad 
supervisory powers that allow it to intervene in proceedings before the national authorities and which in fact 
enable it to act as primus inter pares. See Article 11(6). 
40
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report on the 
Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, o.c., paras. 190 and 200. 
41
 As a result of the merger, the ECA consists of three divisions - competition, railway and energy 
regulation and communications regulation. Hence, the different divisions of the ECA regulate also specific 
sectors. 
42
 Bulgarian Law on Protection of Competition (LPC), State Gazette, Issue 102, 28 Nov. 2008, 
entered into force in May 2009. Prior to the adoption of the 2008 Law on Protection of Competition, there was 
quite some debate around whether or not prosecution of unfair trade practices should be excluded from the remit 
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be found in the portfolio of other NCAs as well, for example in Germany. Then there are 
NCAs that combine the enforcement of competition law and some specific parts of consumer 
law related to information, such as rules against deception or misleading advertising. This is 
the case in Hungary or Italy. A variation on this model is an agency with a double mission: 
responsibilities for the enforcement of both competition law and consumer protection law 
such as the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading (OFT) or the Polish Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK).43 The third model is where the sole 
competence of the NCA includes the enforcement of competition law, like in Romania or 
Portugal. An overview of the different models is provided in Table II. 
TABLE II - Competences of the NCAs 
Competence of 
competition agency 
includes unfair 
competition or consumer 
protection 
Competence of competition agency 
includes other regulator yarea than 
competition law  
Competence of competition 
agency include sonly competition 
law 
Bulgaria, Poland, 
Hungary, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia, Italy, 
Malta, France, United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain 
 
Austria, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Germany 
 
Romania, Greece, Portugal, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, 
Slovakia, Cyprus, Slovenia 
 
The relevance of the different agency models can be seen in the growing recognition 
of the importance of institutions in economic and legal reforms. Institutions can considerably 
influence the implementation of legal rules and administrative policies.44 Therefore, the 
effectiveness of law and economic reforms also depends on the institutional environment 
                                                                                                                                                         
of the Commission for the Protection of Competition and vested with the Commission for Consumer Protection. 
Eventually, the Commission for the Protection of Competition retained the powers to enforce the unfair trade 
practice rules. 
43
 The Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) was established in 1990 as the 
Antimonopoly Office. (AO) A significant change took place in 1996, when after the reform of the central 
administration, the AO received its present name - the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (Urząd 
Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów - UOKiK.) The extent of its activities was simultaneously extended to 
include the protection of consumer interest. In 2000 the Office started monitoring the state aid granted to 
entrepreneurs and supervision of general product safety. On 16 February 2007 a new Act of Competition and 
Consumer Protection was adopted. In order to improve the effectiveness of the Office’s operations, the Act 
eliminated the institution of proceedings launched upon a motion with regard to practices restricting competition 
and infringing collective consumer interests. The Act empowers the President of the Offices to impose fines on 
undertakings which have infringed collective consumer interest. In 2002 the Offices made an effort to create a 
market supervision system for products under community directives and a fuel quality monitoring system. 
44
 The relevance of institutions has already been emphasised by Stiglitz, who argued that stages of 
economic development indicated the existence of the necessary pre-conditions for the development of the 
institutions required for a well-functioning market economy and the capability of the institutional apparatus to 
generate wealth for the citizens. J. STIGLITZ, “Participation and Development: Perspectives from the 
Comprehensive Development Paradigm”, Review of Development Economics, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2002, pp. 163-
182, at p. 164. 
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comprising background constraints that guide individual behaviour. These constraints can be 
formal explicit rules such as codes of conduct, norms of behaviour and conventions, and 
informal, often implicit, rules.45 Moreover, not only the institutional design but also 
reorganisations in the form of shifting legislative powers between regulatory agencies, can 
substantially influence the actual enforcement of legal rules. For example, many Member 
States have introduced the power to investigate private premises, but its practical application 
has remained limited. Similarly, many Member States have followed the Commission’s 
example in introducing leniency programmes, but the application of these programmes has 
faced resource constraints, or, due to inappropriate design of the law, has resulted in 
uncertainty for businesses with regard to eligibility. 
Despite the relevance of institutional designs, comparative studies have so far 
remained modest and have taken place within the framework of larger international 
organisations such as the OECD and the ICN. The OECD has previously discussed optimal 
competition agency, but the focus of this survey was on the ‘external’ design, that is, the place 
of this authority in the administrative structure, its relations to other bodies - horizontal and 
vertical - and its competences rather than the ‘internal’ organisational structure.46 The Seventh 
Global Competition Forum of the OECD discussed the allocation of regulatory powers in the 
field of consumer protection and competition law.47 Discussions on agency design have taken 
place within the International Competition Network, which has even launched a project and 
allocated a Working Group to the subject of agency effectiveness.48 The ICN project produced 
a report in 2009, which contains an analysis of the relation between the definition of priorities 
and resource allocation and the effectiveness of competition agencies’ decisions with a focus 
on compliance with agency decisions (e.g. payment of fines, compliance with behavioural and 
structural remedies imposed; for example, divestitures, amendments to contracts).49 The report 
                                                 
45
 P.G. KLEIN, “New Institutional Economics”, in B. BOUCKAERT and G. De GEEST eds., 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000, pp. 458-459; W.E. KOVACIC, 
“Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of Competition 
Policy and Antitrust Enforcement”, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 77, 2001, p. 265. 
46
 OECD, Optimal Design of a Competition Agency, C CNM/GF/COMP(2003)2, p. 2. 
47
 OECD, Global Forum on Competition, The interface between competition and consumer policies, 
Background Note, DAF/COMP/GF(2008)4. 
48
 International Competition Network, Competition Policy implementation Working Group: sub 
group 1, Agency Effectiveness Project, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-
groups/current/agency-effectiveness.aspx. See also W.E. KOVACIC, The Federal Trade Commission at 100: 
Into Our Second Century, Presentation Before the 21st Annual Western Conference of the Rutgers University 
Center for Research in Regulated Industries, Monterey, California, 18 June,2008. 
49
 International Competition Network, Report on the Agency Effectiveness Project: Second Phase – 
Effectiveness of Decisions, 2009, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc375.pdf. 
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acknowledges that effectiveness of agencies depends on a variety of factors such as strategic 
planning, prioritisation, project delivery, knowledge management, ex-post evaluation, human 
resource management and communication and accountability. However, it does not elaborate 
on the portfolio of the authorities, the tasks and competences they have and how those factors 
influence the effectiveness of enforcement. No similar studies exist on the institutional 
designs of the NCAs in the EU Member States. 
 
IV. Comparing competition laws of the EU Member States 
 
In the following the Commission’s and the Member States’ incentives and methods as 
well as the effects of comparing national and EU competition laws will be discussed by 
analysing the Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003 and the work of the ECN.  
 
A. Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 
 
Regulation 1/2003 required the Commission to prepare a report on its operation by 1 
May 2009. The aim of the Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 was to understand 
and assess how modernisation of the EU competition enforcement rules has worked during the 
first five years from its entry into force. The preparation of the report involved a fact-finding 
phase to obtain input from stakeholders.50 The Report on the Functioning of Regulation 
1/2003 and the accompanying Staff Working Paper evaluate the substantive and procedural 
aspects of the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 by both the Commission and the national 
authorities. Thus in fact, these two documents serve as a comparative analysis of the EU and 
national legal rules as well as EU and national practice of enforcement. The Staff Working 
Paper extensively discusses national rules concerning unilateral conduct where the 
convergence rule does not apply,51 the procedural rules defining the NCAs’ enforcement 
powers52 as well as the evolving structures of NCAs.53 
The Commission concludes that the Report, and thus this comparative analysis, serve 
as a basis for the Commission to assess, at a further stage, whether it is appropriate to propose 
                                                 
50
 The Commission received submissions from businesses and business associations, law firms, 
lawyers' associations and academia. The Member States’ competition authorities have been closely associated 
with the preparation of the report and have provided detailed input.  
51
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report on the 
Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, o.c., paras. 160-176 
52
 Ibid., paras. 195-207. 
53
 Ibid., paras. 190-194. 
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any revision of the Regulation and extend the conversion of national rules in accordance with 
the EU legal framework. The Staff Working Paper actually says that “such a policy discussion 
should also explore the means by which procedural convergence could best be achieved, e.g. 
soft harmonisation or the adoption of certain minimum standards through legislative rules.” 54 
The report highlights a limited number of areas which merit further evaluation, such as 
the procedures of national competition authorities and the area of unilateral conduct. 
However, the enforcement of EU competition laws is not only influenced by the fact that 
NCAs apply the EU rules according to divergent procedures and may impose a variety of 
sanctions, but also by divergent institutional settings, which should also be examined. The 
possibility of further harmonisation will be discussed in section V. In the next section the 
comparative work of the ECN will be analysed. 
 
B. Comparing laws in the ECN  
 
The ECN is a network formed by the national competition authorities of the EU 
Member States and the Commission, co-operating closely on European competition law. The 
ECN was created as a forum for discussion and regular contact and consultation in the 
application and enforcement of EU competition policy as well as in cases where NCAs apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The two main pillars of the network are case allocation and 
information exchange.  
The ECN is a highly juridified network with detailed cooperation mechanisms defined 
in Regulation 1/2003 and the Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition 
Authorities.55 The ECN did not emerge at the initiative of the Member States, but was 
centrally designed and established by the Commission. It is characterised by formalism in 
order to safeguard consistent law application and it has a hierarchical structure where the 
Commission holds a central position vis-à-vis the Member States. While the ECN was 
primarily designed as a policy enforcement network, in fact it seems to function as a policy 
making network operating through policy discussions and mutual policy learning among the 
NCAs. It is clear that the ECN represents an active platform of comparative analysis among 
                                                 
54
 Ibid., para. 207. 
55
 European Commission, Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 27 
April 2004,Official Journal, 2004, C 101. 
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the NCAs56, resulting in visible harmonisation, such as the ECN Model Leniency 
Programme,57 the review process of Article 102 and sector specific regulations.58  
The work of the ECN is organised at four different levels: yearly meetings of the 
Directors General of the European Competition Authorities, Plenary meetings, horizontal 
working groups and sector-specific subgroups. The Director General’s meeting is the forum 
for discussing major policy issues such as the review of the Commission’s policy on Article 
102, the ECN Model Leniency Programme, increases in food and energy prices and the 
financial crisis. The ECN Plenary discusses horizontal policy issues of common interest such 
as the ability of national competition authorities to disapply state measures in their application 
of the EU competition rules. Within the ECN Plenary, several working groups operate which 
deal with horizontal issues of a legal, economic or procedural nature, situated at the interface 
between EU law and the different national laws, for example leniency programmes, sanctions, 
or even the review of vertical and horizontal agreements. Within these horizontal working 
groups, there are subgroups that engage in discussions on particular sectors. 59 
The ECN has a clear influence on both EU and national competition laws, 
demonstrated by the voluntary harmonisation of procedural rules. Cengiz argues that the 
success of the ECN is mainly to be found in its informal mechanisms of information 
exchange. She adds that at the same time, this comes with certain costs in terms of 
accountability and due process as a result of the ECN’s isolation from the outside world.60 
While in theory national parliaments control NCAs, and the European Parliament the 
Commission, these mechanisms have proved weak due to information asymmetries.61 
Moreover, the procedures of the ECN and its main output in the form of soft law instruments 
marginalise judicial control by the European courts, as confirmed by the General Court in 
France Télécom.62 
                                                 
56
 See ECN Working Group on Cooperation Issues, Results of the Questionnaire on the Reform of 
Member States National Competition Laws after EC Regulation No. 1/2003, 14 April 2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/ecn_convergencequest_April2008.pdf. 
57
 ECN Model Leniency Programme, Report on Assessment of the State of Convergence, 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/model_leniency_programme.pdf.  
58
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report on the 
Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, o.c., paras. 248-249. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 F. CENGIZ, Regulation 1/2003 Revisited, o.c., pp. 23-25. 
61
 Ibid., p. 24; C. SCOTT, “Accountability in Regulatory State”, Journal of Law and Society, 2000, pp. 
38-60. 
62
 C.F.I., Case T-340/03, France Télécom SA v. Commission, 2007, ECR II-107,  para.83. 
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The output of the ECN as well as these accountability problems also have to be 
evaluated by having regard to the Commission’s role in the ECN. The comparative work 
within the ECN and the possibility to function as a melting pot of national laboratories is 
limited by the dominance of the Commission and its clear intention to push EU law as the 
benchmark of harmonisation. This can be seen through the convergence rule in Article 3 of 
Regulation 1/2003 and the Commission’s plan to harmonise further substantive and 
procedural rules.  
 
C. The purpose of comparing laws 
 
The reason behind comparing national and EU competition laws is the need for 
coherent and uniform application of EU competition law, effective judicial protection and 
effective administrative enforcement in compliance with the principle of effet utile. 
Comparing national laws was brought about by the increased role of national procedural rules 
in the enforcement of EU competition rules. The direct connection between procedural and 
substantive rules can affect the outcome of a case considerably. As mentioned above, the 
decentralised enforcement of EU competition law made the actual outcome of EU competition 
rules subject to 27 administrative procedural laws. The Commission is concerned about the 
transparency of such a multi-faceted enforcement system and how this affects legal certainty 
and ultimately the level playing field for undertakings. Transparency, equal and fair access to 
justice might not be guaranteed by such an enforcement system with diverging national 
procedures.63 
As for the Member States, they can use the consultative nature of the ECN to justify 
‘Europeanisation’ of national policy. On the other hand, while the NCAs are being held 
accountable and they are evaluated by national control and audit mechanisms such as annual 
reports submitted to the parliaments, there is also a certain ‘peer accountability’ present within 
the ECN and other international networks such as the ICN and the OECD.64 Even though the 
ECN was initially created in order to guard uniform and consistent enforcement of Articles 
                                                 
63
 Similarly, the Storme Commission argued that international businesses required an effective and 
transparent system of procedural law, and citizens an equal and fair access to justice; these results could only be 
achieved if a harmonised system of procedural rules was set up. M. STORME ed., Approximation of Judiciary 
Law in the European Union, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, pp. 44-45. 
64
 Within the ECN, for example, all NCAs’ annual reports are published in English on the website of 
the Commission’s DG Competition, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/annual_reports.html. 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES – VOL 3 ISSUE 1 (2010) 
 28 
101 and 102 TFEU, it has proved to be a notable forum for discussing enforcement methods, 
for mutual learning and even for informally converging enforcement policies.  
It is apparent from the Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 that the 
Commission is using Regulation 1/2003 and its further legislation in EU competition law, 
such as the Leniency Notice65, as the benchmark of comparison.66 However, if the ECN was 
to serve as a valid framework for regulatory competition between Member States’ laws, then 
it should be left to this competitive process to yield the most effective or most efficient rules 
between all the 27 national laws and the EU law. The comparison of national laws should not 
be steered by the Commission and should not be based on the benchmark provided by the EU 
rules. Even though application of EU rules in parallel with national law makes convergence 
with EU law easier in practice, it is argued that a more objective and more efficient approach 
would be to enable competition between all 28 alternatives.  
So far, the Commission has conducted the most extensive and comprehensive 
comparative studies in the field of private enforcement of competition law with the clear 
purpose of harmonising national procedural laws at a later stage. This comparative exercise is 
worth mentioning as it also illuminates the Commission’s overall policy with regard to 
harmonising national procedural rules. 
 
a. Comparing laws for private enforcement of competition law 
 
Irrespective of the Community’s lack of competence in private law matters, the 
European Commission has taken a number of concrete steps in order to facilitate damages 
actions for the breach of European competition rules. The Commission published the Ashurst 
study in 2004, which found an “astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment” of private 
damages actions in the EU.67 In order to stimulate private enforcement, the Commission 
published a Green Paper on how to facilitate actions for damages caused by violations of EC 
competition rules in December 2005.68 The Green Paper outlined the reasons for the low 
levels of private enforcement of competition rules and found that the failure is largely due to 
                                                 
65
 European Commission, Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases,  8 
Dec. 2006, Official Journal, C 298. 
66
 ECN Working Group on Cooperation Issues, Results of the Questionnaire on the Reform of 
Member States National Competition Laws after EC Regulation No. 1/2003, o.c. 
67
 D. WAELBROEK, D. SLATER and G. EVEN-SHOSHAN, Study on the Conditions of Claims for 
Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules, 2004. 
68
 European Commission, Green Paper: Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Anti-trust Rules, No 
COM(2005) 672 final, 19 December 2005. 
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various legal and procedural hurdles in the Member States’ rules governing actions for 
antitrust damages before national courts. In 2008, the Commission published a White Paper69 
that made detailed and specific proposals to address the obstacles to effective damages 
actions.  
Both the Green Paper and the White Paper addressed the main divergences of tort 
laws across the various Member States. The documents in fact argued that the differences 
among the various models of tort laws jeopardise the effective private enforcement of 
European competition law. At the same time they also clearly contrasted the high convergence 
of competition laws with the considerable divergences in tort laws.70  
After the major comparative Ashurst study on the development of damages claims in 
the 25 Member States the Commission laid a causal link between the low degree of litigation 
resulting in much of the harm caused by anti-competitive practices remaining uncompensated, 
and the disparities in the tort and procedural laws of the Member States. This causal link was 
clearly stated in both the Green Paper of 2005 and the White Paper of 2008. In both 
documents the Commission concluded that the exercise of the right to damages in Europe is 
still facing considerable hurdles because the “traditional tort rules of the Member States, 
either of a legal or procedural nature, are often inadequate for actions for damages in the field 
of competition law, due to the specificities of actions in this field.” In addition, the different 
approaches taken by the Member States can lead to differences in treatment and to less 
foreseeability for the victims as well as the defendants, i.e. to a high degree of legal 
uncertainty.71  
The Commission established a similar line of argumentation in the Report on the 
Functioning of Regulation 1/2003 and its accompanying Staff Working Paper, indicating that 
it is necessary to assess the potential problems related to the divergences of unilateral conduct 
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rules, procedural rules and institutional matters and to explore alternative further actions.72 
The Commission in fact, now makes a far-reaching attempt to bridge “what until now seemed 
to be the ‘unbridgeable’.”73 
 
V. Further harmonisation of national substantive and procedural rules 
 
While harmonisation and convergence of substantive competition laws is well 
advanced, a similar convergence and harmonisation of the procedural rules and institutional 
frameworks has not taken place. The Commission argued that these divergences merit further 
examination and reflection. In fact, it has taken an initial step towards further harmonising 
substantive rules on unilateral conduct and procedural rules. It has stated that it considers soft 
harmonisation or the adoption of certain minimum standards through legislative rules.74 
Whether procedural rules and substantive rules on unilateral conduct (mostly administrative 
but in some Member States criminal) should be harmonised is questionable. 
In the following, a critical look is taken at the Commission’s proposal to further 
harmonise rules on unilateral conduct and the procedural framework of competition law 
enforcement. First, it will be examined whether this is legally, i.e. what legal basis and which 
legal arguments the Commission could use in order to further harmonise procedural rules. 
Second, it will be examined whether harmonising rules on unilateral conduct and further 
harmonisation of procedural rules would be more efficient than the existing legal diversity. 
The economics of harmonisation will be applied to assess the top-down harmonisation by the 
Union and comparative law and economics is applied to evaluate the bottom-up voluntary 
harmonisation of the Member States. 
 
A. Harmonisation of procedural rules through the backdoor?  
 
The Commission’s intention to further harmonise national procedural rules for the 
public enforcement of EU competition law exhibits similar legal problems as the 
Commission’s ongoing ambitious policy project on private enforcement, where in fact the 
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harmonisation of private law rules and civil procedures is at stake.75 In both cases, the 
Commission faces the problem that it lacks competence and a clear legal basis to harmonise 
procedural rules. The private law consequences of competition law infringements as well as 
the administrative procedures fall within the competence of the Member States in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity and so-called national procedural autonomy. It is, therefore, 
for the Member States to provide for remedies to effectuate damages actions and it is for the 
national courts to hear cases.76  
In accordance with Article 5 TEU, the Union is only empowered to act within the 
competences conferred upon it by the Treaty. With regard to the harmonisation of procedural 
rules, one could turn to Article 114 TFEU (ex 95 EC), which forms the legal basis for 
harmonisation measures when such measures have as their objective the establishment and the 
functioning of the internal market. For example, the Public Procurement Remedies Directives 
were issued on this legal basis.77 However, this Article has been strictly interpreted by the 
Community Courts and it can be applied only when it can be proved that without the 
harmonisation measures the functioning of the internal market would be endangered and 
competition distorted. The ECJ, among others, held that the goal of the Commission’s 
intervention had to be stated precisely by explaining the actual problems consumers faced in 
the internal market and the actual obstacles to the free movement principles as well as the 
distortions of competition. In Germany v. Parliament and Council, the ECJ said explicitly that 
“a measure adopted on the basis of Article 100a of the Treaty must genuinely have as its 
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object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market. If a mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of 
obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition liable to 
result therefrom were sufficient to justify the choice of Article 100a as a legal basis, judicial 
review of compliance with the proper legal basis might be rendered nugatory.”78 Accordingly, 
the Commission has to define the legal problems precisely by providing clear evidence of 
their nature and magnitude, explaining why they have arisen and identifying the incentives of 
affected entities and their consequent behaviour.  
Since the Amsterdam Treaty, Article 81 TFEU (ex Article 65 TEC) can be applied as 
the legal basis for harmonisation of civil procedural law. This legal basis can be used with 
regard to civil matters which have cross-border implications and as long as common rules are 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market. It could be argued that even though this 
legal basis concerns civil procedural measures, it could be applicable also to administrative 
procedural law.79  
Both Article 114 and 81 TFEU require a justification for procedural harmonisation 
measures by showing that the functioning of the internal market is at stake, namely that the 
direct effect of substantive EU law might be at risk and market competition would not take 
place on equal terms, unless at least some minimal requirements concerning procedure were 
upheld in all Member States. Only then, there would be adequate grounds to support the 
introduction of harmonised remedies in national courts. Accordingly, in order to decide upon 
the necessity of EU harmonisation measures in the field of procedural law, the negative 
effects of diverging judicial remedies for European integration should be estimated. 
The influence of procedural differences in the Member States on the internal market 
could be analysed by looking at their impact on business actors. For example, competition 
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would be distorted when business actors have to reduce their business in a certain Member 
State because of the difficulty that they might encounter in enforcing their EU law.  
Consequently, the benefits of harmonised procedural rules may be transparency and legal 
certainty, which might be much appreciated especially from the perspective of economic 
policy and competition. In particular, it can be argued that those participating in the economic 
life of the Community would benefit from a clear and transparent system in which they would 
be able to enforce their claims against public authorities all over Europe, pursuant to the same 
procedural rules.80 This raises the question whether procedural harmonisation may be pursued 
in a ‘compartmentalised’ way for specific policy areas.81 Two suggestions in the private 
enforcement debate are worth mentioning with regard to administrative procedures. They both 
concern a separate harmonisation of economic torts or in the present case economic 
administrative procedures. Heinemann proposed that general tort rules of the DCFR could be 
examined against the backdrop of the special needs of competition law.82 Van Boom proposed 
a compartmentalised approach to work with the existing modest body of European tort law. 
By addressing the policy issues involved in each of these torts one by one, the European 
Union can make harmonised tort law more attainable. He pointed out that a likely candidate 
for harmonisation is the category of economic torts, such as the protection of intellectual 
property through tort law, liability for infringement of competition rules and liability for 
misleading advertising.83 
The next section discusses the economic arguments of harmonisation and legal 
diversity. 
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B. The economics of harmonisation  
 
As mentioned above, in EU law the harmonisation process is governed by the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. These principles entail a cost-benefit analysis of 
legislation and require minimisation of transaction costs. The economics of harmonisation 
discusses the costs and benefits of legal diversity and harmonization. It addresses the optimal 
level of intervention by applying the economic theory of federalism as extended to the theory 
of regulatory competition.  
The idea that decentralised decision making may contribute to efficient policy choices 
in markets for legislation was first formulated by Tiebout in his classic article on the optimal 
provision of local public goods.84 Tiebout’s model has been extended to legal rules and 
institutions. The theory of regulatory competition applies the dynamic view of competition to 
sellers of laws and choice between legal orders offering a number of criteria to judge whether 
centralisation or decentralisation is more successful in achieving the objectives of the 
proposed legislation.85 In this section, these criteria will be applied to the Commission’s 
harmonisation proposals in order to analyse the probable costs and benefits of top-down rule-
making. 
One reason to harmonise rules of unilateral conduct as well as procedural rules is that 
their difference across countries may lead to adverse externalities for other Member States. 
Such negative spillover effects could very likely flow from the protection of national interests 
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by unilateral conduct rules, but might be present with regard to different procedures as well.  
While such negative externalities can be internalised by harmonisation, bargaining between 
the Member States can also solve this problem. According to the Coase theorem, when 
property rights are well specified, transaction costs are low, and information is complete, 
bargaining can be an efficient solution.86 In fact, the ECN provides an appropriate institutional 
framework for such bargaining between the Member States. As mentioned above, one of the 
successes of the ECN has been policy cooperation in the field of unilateral conduct and 
procedures. 
Another reason in favour of harmonisation is that different legal rules carry the risk of 
destructive competition. Such a ‘race to the bottom’ development has often been linked to and 
criticised as a result of competition among jurisdictions. It has been argued that competition 
among legal rules drives social, environmental, cultural and other standards down. This 
argument has mainly been embraced in international corporate law by making reference to the 
‘Delaware effect’. However, the risk of such declining levels of standards has not yet been 
proved87 and what little empirical evidence exists is inconclusive. Furthermore, international 
trade may even stimulate a race to the top.88 Gomez also argues that the outcome of such a 
competitive process cannot be examined without taking into account the relative power of the 
affected groups.89 Such competition might not harm powerful and well-organised groups, but 
could have different effects for small and medium sized enterprises and consumers. 
Furthermore, the ECN serves as a platform for discussion and cooperation, and as such it can 
function as an information device between Member States. This function of the ECN reduces 
the prisoners’ dilemma conditions, where a race to the bottom is likely to take place. As 
explained above, it also acts as an incentive to align the national laws voluntarily. 
A third argument often raised to support harmonisation, is to achieve economies of 
scale and to reduce transaction costs. Transaction costs can be high when firms and consumers 
have to search and comply with different sets of national rules. In case of uniform rules, the 
search costs of information could be saved and complying with one set of rules can achieve 
economies of scale. Uniform competition rules can guarantee more stable and predictable 
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jurisprudence and contribute considerably to transparency and legal certainty. These 
arguments promote centralised rules in competition law, and this has clearly been formulated 
by the stakeholders in the review process of Regulation 1/2003 as well.90 However, these 
costs can be especially relevant for large firms operating in interstate commerce, the same 
might not hold for small and medium sized undertakings operating mainly in national markets 
or for consumers. Therefore, as mentioned above the impact of such harmonization also has to 
be analyzed with having regard to the relative power of the affected groups.  
Furthermore, while uniform rules help to maintain economies of scale, which is an 
important argument for centralisation, they can only be advantageous from an ex ante 
perspective, when neither the Member States nor the Community have as yet adopted certain 
legislation.91 This is neither the case with regard to the rules on unilateral conduct, nor with 
regard to administrative procedural rules, which are rooted in old legal traditions and 
characteristics of the different legal systems.  
When all parties in one region have identical preferences, cost efficiency 
considerations might point to harmonising through one single instrument that suits all. This is 
clearly in line with the preferences of the business community, which is in favour of uniform 
rules.92 However, the preferences of consumers and public administration can diverge 
significantly. In fact, it has been argued that the legal systems of the Member States are built 
through habits, customs and practices which dictate how law is going to be interpreted,93 and 
that public law “has particularly deep roots inside a cultural and political framework”.94 This 
is clearly the case with regard to unilateral conduct as the above description of the various 
legislative alternatives of the Member States has shown.  
Accordingly, the possibility of achieving a common procedural administrative law in 
Europe is doubtful, because the political conditions are missing and because the national legal 
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systems are based on very different conceptions.95 The same is true for bridging the gaps 
between the various economic policies and the corresponding national rules on unilateral 
conduct. Harmonisation of administrative procedures might conflict with legitimate national 
interests, such as the need to protect fairness and efficiency in the administration of justice.96 
Due to these fundamental differences in national administrative procedures, it would be very 
difficult to agree on common rules for all 27 jurisdictions. In fact, it has been argued that “a 
general codification could be achieved only by reducing the requirements to the level of a 
common denominator, in which case it would prove as a barrier rather than an asset for an 
effective and uniform enforcement of Community law”.97 Moreover, some Member States 
may prefer to implement criminal law procedures for the enforcement of the most severe 
competition law violations, as is already the case in a significant number of Member States.98  
In sum, there are insufficient economic arguments in favour of harmonisation, but 
there are good economic arguments in support of legal diversity. One such argument is that a 
larger set of legislations can satisfy a wider range of preferences, which leads to allocative 
efficiency. The broad range of preferences can easily be seen behind the various different 
regulations on unilateral conduct, but it also holds for administrative procedures. Another 
argument is the existence of information asymmetries which support decentralisation by 
maintaining the principles of subsidiarity and procedural autonomy. When information at the 
local level is more valuable for rule-making and law enforcement, decentralisation is more 
efficient.99 Competition between these legal rules has the advantages of a learning process. 
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National laboratories100 produce different rules that allow for different experiences and which 
can improve the understanding of alternative legal solutions. These advantages are relevant 
both to the formulation of substantive rules as well as law enforcement. Moreover, legal 
diversity and competition does not necessarily exclude harmonisation. In fact, dynamic 
competition between legal rules can lead to voluntary convergence, which in turn can be more 
effective and successful than forced coordination of legislations. Instead, the Commission 
could guarantee the conditions for regulatory competition and let this process work up to 
voluntary harmonisation. These conditions could in fact be ensured within the ECN. However, 
the ECN does have some relevant shortcomings in functioning as a true platform for 
regulatory competition and voluntary harmonisation. These shortcomings will be addressed in 
the next section. 
 
C. Voluntary harmonisation 
 
As explained above, Regulation 1/2003 did not formally intervene in the procedures of 
national competition authorities over and beyond Article 5 of the Regulation and the rules 
applicable to cooperation mechanisms. The Staff Working Paper stated that in important 
respects, the Regulation reconciled the requirements of substantive coherence with the 
existing procedural diversity amongst European competition authorities.101 Moreover, the 
Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of 
Competition Authorities stated that the “Member States accept that their enforcement systems 
differ but nonetheless mutually recognize the standards of each other’s system as a basis for 
cooperation.”102 Still, the Staff Working Paper acknowledged that the entry into force of 
Regulation 1/2003 has generated an unprecedented degree of voluntary convergence of the 
procedural rules dedicated to the implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This section 
will analyse the underlying reasons and incentives behind this process of voluntary 
harmonisation by making use of insights from comparative law and economics. 
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Comparative law and economics compares and evaluates the law of alternative legal 
systems with the ‘efficient’ model offered by economic theory.103 It deals with ‘legal 
transplants’ by measuring them with the tool of efficiency and offers an economic analysis of 
institutional alternatives tested in legal history.104 It “deals with the transplants that have been 
made, why and how they were made, and the lessons to be learned from this”.105 While 
providing comparative lawyers with the measuring tools of economics, it places the notion of 
efficiency in a dynamic perspective by offering a comparative dimension with concrete 
alternative rules and institutions.106 
Convergence between different legal rules towards an efficient model may take place 
as a result of a legal transplant or as an outcome of a competitive process between different 
legal formants.107 In the first case, legal transplants are implemented because they proved to 
be efficient in other legal systems. In the second case, convergence towards efficiency is the 
result of the interaction between different legal formants. So, while legal transplants are 
governed by hierarchy, the second scenario is characterised by competition.108 
As section 2 of this paper and Table I demonstrated above, EU Member States 
voluntarily harmonised some elements of the national procedures in competition law. Yet, this 
process displays some shortcomings in terms of the used benchmark and in terms of the 
ECN’s methods to achieve convergence.  
Convergence between the different national rules uses Regulation 1/2003 and some 
accompanying soft-law instruments as its benchmark. Thus, harmonisation took place so far 
took place through imposed legal transplants and through implementation by the Member 
States of similar procedural rules as those of the Commission’s. The underlying rationale 
might be that if these rules and enforcement methods have worked effectively and efficiently 
in the hands of the Commission, they will prove successful in the hands of the NCAs as well. 
However, the efficiency of these rules and their comparative advantage vis-à-vis other 
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national rules have neither been analysed nor confirmed. Furthermore, the success of such 
legal transplants is not guaranteed in the different institutional frameworks of the Member 
States, where agencies often have to divide resources between several competences. The 
actual outcome of enforcement depends heavily on the existing institutional framework.  
The influence of the institutional framework should not be underestimated in 
measuring actual law enforcement and in understanding why a certain legal rule proves to be 
successful or fails in different institutional contexts.109 Neo-institutional economics110 
emphasises the relevance of institutions and path dependence in explaining the evolution of 
legal systems both when legal change is endogenous and when it results from a legal 
transplant. Similar measures will lead to different outcomes because of diverging informal 
rules and informal constraints in different economies. Institutional path dependency is the 
downstream institutional choice inherent in any institutional framework which makes it 
difficult to alter the direction of an economy once it is in a certain institutional path. Formal 
rules can be changed overnight, but informal constraints change slowly.111  
The insights of institutional economics have proved especially helpful in explaining 
the experience of the CEECs with regard to their transition process from central planning to a 
market economy and the implementation of competition laws.112 The new enforcement 
models of the European Commission have a strong influence in all Member States. However, 
actual application of the mode was especially weak in the CEECs.113  
Despite the blueprint convergence of procedural rules the NCAs could not or did not 
actually enforce these rules due to certain constraints present in their institutional framework. 
The strengthened enforcement tools have not always delivered the expected results in actual 
enforcement. This is, for example, the case with regard to the power to investigate private 
premises. No actual experience of this form of investigation exists in Cyprus, Spain, Sweden, 
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the Czech Republic, Greece, Luxembourg, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. In Portugal, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy and Denmark, this form of investigation has not 
even been foreseen in the competition rules.114 
A similar experience can be found with regard to leniency programmes, which are 
often praised as the model for procedural convergence and a clear result of the cooperation 
mechanism within the ECN. However, Malta does not have a leniency programme. As for the 
CEECs, even though they have clearly defined leniency programmes (and Slovenia applies 
some other provisions that make termination of proceedings or fine reduction possible), the 
actual application has so far been very limited. The programmes adopted initially proved to be 
unproductive as a result of insufficient transparency or uncertainty about eligibility. That is 
why many national programmes have recently been revised and slowly begin to be applied in 
competition proceedings in the Member States.115 
In addition, the comparison of national laws within the ECN seems to be steered from 
the center by the Commission, establishing the EU rules as the benchmark for harmonisation. 
While the Commission was seemingly decentralising enforcement powers, in fact it has retained a 
central policy-making role but without any control mechanism. As mentioned above, the work 
and procedures of the ECN are determined by soft-law measures beyond Regulation 1/2003 
and the Network Notice, which procedures are not subject to judicial review by the EU 
Courts. The work in the ECN results in non-binding policy communications, but these might 
imply significant policy changes.116 Due to the ECN’s lack of transparency, it is difficult to 
see whether the harmonisation resulting from its work is the outcome of regulatory 
competition or legal transplants. The ECN’s success could be seen in its character of a new 
mode of governance based on consultation, negotiations and soft-law instruments instead of 
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on command and hierarchy in the form of hard law.117 However, flexibility should be 
balanced with formal controls on the Commission’s as well as the NCAs’ activities. 
Still, the ECN is a significant channel of harmonisation in a bottom-up perspective. 
The ECN has increased pressure on the agencies to quantify their enforcement and advocacy 
work.118 This process is encouraged further by reputation mechanisms such as the OECD 
country reports, the International Competition Network or even the Global Competition 
Review rankings.119 These mechanisms make actual enforcement modalities more visible and 
may induce competition among the agencies. Even though enforcement methods legislated in 
soft-law instruments at the EU level do not oblige Member States to follow those guidelines, 
there is certainly some pressure both from the Commission as well as within the ECN to adopt 
similar instruments in national legislations.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
Until now, comparative analysis has not been closely associated with competition law. 
Even after the decentralisation of EU competition law enforcement, one might not think of the 
need to compare national laws, as one of the main achievements of the new system was an 
increased convergence of substantive national rules. However, the new enforcement system 
made the differences between national procedural rules and institutional settings visible as the 
decentralised enforcement of EU rules necessitated a closer look at the procedures framing 
law enforcement and the institutions enforcing the competition rules. As the Commission no 
longer holds the exclusive position of enforcing EU competition law, but has to safeguard the 
uniform and consistent application of EU rules, it was urged to compare national procedures 
and assess the impact of the differences. The Commission has done so clearly with the aim of 
further harmonising national rules and thus creating a level playing field also in areas 
presently outside of the realm of EU law, such as unilateral conduct and procedural rules. The 
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Commission’s comparative analysis and its conclusions have been documented in the Report 
on Regulation 1/2003 and can be also deduced from the ECN’s work. One field which is 
remarkably absent in these comparative exercises, is the examination of the different 
institutional designs. Although the impact of different institutional settings on law 
enforcement has not been entirely neglected by the Commission, it has not explored this issue 
deeply.  
This paper took a critical look at the Commission’s intention to further harmonise 
certain substantive and procedural rules of the Member States. There seem to be few 
arguments to do so. Not only do relevant legal and constitutional problems arise, economic 
arguments also favour legal diversity. First, the Commission faces the problem of the lack of 
EU competence to harmonise procedural laws. The procedural rules are ‘protected’ by the 
national procedural autonomy of the Member States from EU intervention. Moreover, the 
Commission has furnished no evidence that such harmonisation measures are indeed needed 
for the unification of the internal market. Earlier cases in consumer law should warn the 
Commission that the ECJ will not hesitate to break down and reverse harmonisation measures 
of the Commission when it finds that the legal basis is not justified. The way forward could, 
however, be some kind of compartmentalised harmonisation for procedural rules in the field 
of economic law. Secondly, there are good economic reasons for regulatory competition that 
can be accommodated within the ECN. The ECN is a unique forum for policy discussions and 
comparative work among the NCAs. It has a great potential to serve as the platform for 
exchanging alternative legal solutions of the national competition law laboratories and as a 
melting pot for voluntary harmonisation. Nevertheless, when one examines the methods used 
within the network, significant questions of efficiency and accountability arise. The 
comparison of national laws is managed and steered by the Commission and takes place on 
the basis of the benchmark provided by the EU rules. Moreover, the ECN is not transparent 
for outside actors and the reach of judicial review is marginalised, which leaves the steering 
role of the Commission uncontrolled. The success of the Network needs to be reassessed in 
the light of these fundamental problems. 
The framework for regulatory competition between the Member States and the 
Commission should be guaranteed in an objective and efficient way, without the imposition of 
EU legal transplants. Not EU rules, but genuine competition between the different legal 
formants should dominate. The arguments from comparative law and economics and 
especially from neo-institutional economics emphasising the influence of institutional 
frameworks on actual law enforcement support this approach. Informal harmonisation is a 
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process of social learning through conflict management and contestation,120 which should be 
the result of dynamic processes of competition between legal orders.  
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